W P 0 5 -1 5 D E C E M b E r 2 0 0 5 1 7 5 0 M a s s a c h u s e t t s a v e n u e , n W | W a s h i n g t o n , D c 2 0 0 3 6 -1 9 0 3 t e l : ( 2 0 2 ) 3 2 8 -9 0 0 0 | F a x : ( 2 0 2 ) 6 5 9 -3 2 2 5 | W W W . Abstract This working paper looks in detail at the H-1B and L-1 visa programs for temporary employment in the United States. Based on official data from the US Citizenship and Immigration Services and the US Department of State, H-1B and L-1 visa issuance rapidly increased in the late 1990s, followed by a marked slowdown after 2001. This points to the highly cyclical nature of both visa programs. Indian nationals and immigrants working in computer-related occupations dominate the H1-B and L-1 population in the United States, but these two groups are also found to be the most cyclical segment, with very large declines in inflows after 2001. The total population of H-1B visaholders in 2003 is estimated to range between 387,000 and 746,000, of which 160,000 to 306,000 were Indian nationals. As all data on H-1B/L-1 visaholders are gross numbers and gross jobs data for comparable categories are absent, the extent of the impact of these visa programs on the US labor market cannot be gauged precisely. A broad range of US industries and educational institutions are found to be employing H-1B recipients, with the IT industry being the dominant sector. Evidence of aggressive wage-cost cutting, including paying H-1B recipients only the legally mandated 95 percent of the prevailing US wage, is found among some H-1B employers, although no systematic abuse of the system is present.
Just as the ongoing offshore outsourcing of US jobs to low-wage countries has recently attracted the attention of politicians and business leaders, so has its mirror image-the import of foreign highskilled labor for work in the United States. This working paper takes an in-depth look at available US official statistical data on this important phenomenon and gauges its true extent with particular emphasis on the US information technology (IT) services sector.
Section I briefly describes available data. Section II shows how the aggregate use of foreign imported labor on L-1 and H-1B visas in the United States has been highly cyclical, with a large increase up to 2001 followed by a significant decrease in subsequent years and a rebound in 2004.
The section looks in detail at the sectoral and national characteristics of H-1B visa recipients and gauges the size of the entire H-1B population inside the United States. Section III focuses on the US IT services industry's use of imported labor, the sector's major employers, as well as the wage levels of H-1B visa recipients. Concluding remarks round off the paper.
I. WHERE DO US L-1 AND H-1B VISA DATA COME FROM?
Foreign high-skilled workers enter the US labor market temporarily, 3 predominantly as either "intracompany transferees" (L-1 visaholders 4 ) or "foreign specialist workers" (H-1B visaholders 5 August 3, 2005) . 3 This working paper does not deal with permanent immigrants in the United States, many of whom are also highly skilled. 4 L-1 visas are for individuals being transferred to work for a US-located employer. To be eligible for an L-1 visa, one should have worked abroad for one continuous year within the last three years in a related business entity in a managerial/executive position or in a so-called specialized knowledge staff capacity. For those in the former category of experience, the initial duration of an L-1 visa is three years, extendable up to seven years, while for the latter category, initial duration is also three years but with a possible two-year extension. In June 2005, the US Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) implemented the L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004, which contained a number of amendments to limit the use of imported foreign high-skilled workers on L-1 visas. As such, L-1 visa recipients can no longer work (primarily) at a work site other than that of their petitioning employer if either: (a) the work is controlled and supervised by a different employer or (b) the offsite arrangement is essentially one to provide a nonpetitioning party with local labor for hire, rather than a service related to the specialized knowledge of the petitioning employer. See "USCIS Implements L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004," USCIS press release, June 23, 2005.
3 involving the crossing of international borders) of foreign high-skilled workers into the US workforce, the fact that many H-1B recipients are already inside the United States further complicates the choice of data. Hence, to get a better idea about the number of high-skilled workers entering the US workforce from abroad, the US Department of State's data on H-1B visas actually issued at overseas US consular offices are a better source, as they track the actual number of new high-skilled aliens entering the United States as H-1B workers.
On the other hand, much less data are available for L-1 visas. The application process is somewhat less complicated, although many of the issues from H-1B visas resurface here as well.
Again, the US employer files for the L-1 visa with the USCIS on behalf of the alien worker, 12 who then, if outside the United States, uses this application to obtain an L-1 visa at a US consular office abroad. If the alien is inside the United States at the time, a change of visa status is sought at the USCIS. An important distinction from the H-1B visa is that no labor certification-i.e., statement that the alien is being employed on the same terms as US workers-is required for the L-1 visa.
Unfortunately, no data are available from the USCIS on the total number of L-1 petitions approved, and to get an idea of the number, one has to look at the actual number of L-1 visas issued by overseas US consular offices.
In a different function, the USCIS also collects data on persons in both H-1B and L-1 status when they enter the United States at the border. inflating the number of entries relative to the actual number of persons in a particular visa status. 13 Thus, the number of entries by persons in visa status in a particular visa category in a given period will be significantly higher than the number of visas issued in that period.
II. DATA RESULTS, LEVELS, AND DEVELOPMENTS
Figure 1 presents USCIS data on the number of entries by individuals in H-1B and L-1 visa status into the United States. 14 The data in figure 1 are interesting mainly to discern this time trend and not for the absolute levels, as multiple entries significantly inflate the latter. And even so, such a time trend may be caused by external factors rather than any changes in the actual number of persons in visa status. For instance, a decline in real airfare prices since the early 1990s makes it more likely that individuals in H-1B or L-1 visa status will travel abroad (and hence exit and enter the United States) more today than they would have in 1990, resulting in a rising time trend even if the actual number of visaholders were constant. Similarly, the rapid increase of US foreign direct investment abroad and foreign investment in the United States-i.e., the rise of multinational companies-since 1990 will likely increase the number of entries and exits by individuals in the relevant visa status and hence push up the time trend. This point is particularly important in the case of India, which started its economic liberalization only in 1991.
L-1 Data in Detail
The distinction between data on visaholder entry and those on actual visa issuance becomes clear when data from figure 1 is compared with actual visa issuance data for 1990 to 2004 indicating that just because a developing country is growing rapidly and economically integrating with the world does not mean that its nationals will be issued L-1 visas more intensively. In other words, the rapid increase in Indian nationals' use of L-1 visas does not seem to be just a story of rapid Indian economic growth and embrace of globalization, as this has also occurred in Chinasomething else seems to have happened. 15 It is clear from In summary, the use of the L-1 visa program has increased rapidly in recent years, and Indian nationals now account for a larger share of the total L-1 population. The rising trend in L-1 visa usage indicates increased import of foreign labor (especially Indians) to the US labor market via this program. However, one cannot discern from available data whether this increase in the number of Indians in L-1 visa status is in any specific industry or occupation, particularly IT.
H-1B Data in Detail
Much more official data exist on H-1B than on L-1 visas, which significantly aids the analysis. The
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 17 requires US immigration authorities to annually collect and present to the US Congress information on the countries of origin, occupations, educational attainment, and compensation paid to aliens whose employers successfully petition for their H-1B status. However, more data also mean that they could be misinterpreted.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the four data sources for H-1B information: 1) for whom an employer has petitioned for an H-1B never "shows up" and hence does not need a visa.
The extent of such "absenteeism" among foreign H-1B beneficiaries cannot be gauged but should be expected to be limited, especially in the IT sector, where large differences in wages exist between countries (for instance, between India and the United States). Second, "multiple employers"
(frequently at different levels within the same organization) often petition for the same foreign worker, who subsequently may be granted multiple petitions. Third, employers may apply for multiple H-1B visas in their individual petitions to the USCIS, and as the "immediate use" of approved petitions is not a requirement, US employers may "hoard" such successful petitions, thus inflating the number compared with actual H-1B visas issued in a given period. Fourth, as with L-1 visas, H-1B visas are "entry documents," so if an alien is already inside the United States at the time his or her petition is approved and never leaves the United States during his or her time in employment, no actual H-1B visa needs to issued. 20 Table 3 brings together statistics from USCIS annual reports to the US Congress on the country of origin, occupation, industry sector, and average wage levels of recipients of successful H-1B petitions. It is separated into two panels: Panel A shows data on H-1B petitions granted for initial employment-i.e., to new aliens entering the US labor market (columns 1 to 5). Panel B shows data on H-1B petitions granted for continuing employment-i.e., to aliens already in US employment at the time of issuance (columns 6 to 10). As the trends in the data in the two panels are roughly similar, States, a successful petition need not necessarily result in an addition to the US labor force, as the alien may be transferring from another US visa category and may already be in the US labor force.
For example, an alien could transfer from an academic F-1 visa, which gives the visaholder an option to work for one year (called optional practical training, or OPT) within the United States after graduation from an accredited US educational institution with a baccalaureate or higher academic degree. So if this student were granted an H-1B visa while working in the United States on OPT, it would not result in an addition to the US labor force. With respect to aliens in this "educational pipeline," the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (now the USCIS) provides statistical detail on the previous visa status of beneficiaries of H-1B visa petitions in 1999 who were present in the United States at the time their H-1B visa petitions were approved (numbering 53,300). Of these, 60 percent (30,800) were students. Hence in 1999, about a quarter of the total number of H-1B visa petitions granted for initial employment (134,400) went to aliens who had studied in the United
States and then upon graduation or finishing a year of OPT entered the US labor force. Given that it is relatively administratively simple (and cheap) for an F-1 student graduating from a US university to 21 This is further supported by data from a GAO report (GAO 2000) , which shows that from 1992 to 1998, the number of "new H-1B nonimmigrants approved" was between 50,000 and the annual cap of 65,000. This is substantially lower than the roughly 100,000 entries by individuals in H-1B visa status seen in figure 1. However, data from the GAO publication refer only to those approved H-1B visas that count toward the annual congressional cap. 22 The fact that this number for H-1B petitions for initial employment exceeds the 195,000 congressional cap is testament to why one should not take the cap as an indicator of the number of H-1B visas available annually.
Box 1 The congressional cap on H-1B visas
Possibly the most discussed single number with respect to H-1B visaholders and their economic impact on the US economy is the congressional cap on annual H-1B petitions. This is somewhat unfortunate, as this particular number is almost entirely meaningless when analyzing the actual number of H-1B visaholders in or entering the US labor market. From fiscal 1992 to 1998, the annual cap was 65,000 before being temporarily raised to 115,000 in 1999 However, the following H-1B applicant categories are exempt from the annual congressional cap:
* J-1 visa holders in medical education and training, who have been granted a waiver of the posteducation two-year home residency requirement; * beneficiaries employed at an institution of higher education or related affiliated nonprofit entity; * beneficiaries employed at a nonprofit or governmental research organization; and * beneficiaries who are renewing their H-1B visa status after the expiry of the initial three-year period.
The second and the fourth categories are substantial categories of exemption, as will be illustrated below (see shaded area in table 3). Indeed, exempt categories made up the majority of all successful H-1B petitions approved by the USCIS in 2002 and 2003, which evidently makes the annual congressional cap a very poor indicator of the actual number of new H-1B visas available in a given year.
The two recent US free trade agreements (FTAs) with Chile and Singapore have also had direct implications on the congressional cap such that the agreements earmarked 1,400 and 5,400 H-1B visas per fiscal year to Chilean and Singaporean nationals, respectively. In other words, this in effect cut the number of H-1B visas available to all other aliens from fiscal 2004 onward to just 58,200, or by just over 10 percent.
The inclusion of such visa rules in US FTAs caused some initial political tension in the US Congress. But the actual effect of FTAs on US visa issuance so far has been very modest, since less than 100 H-1B slots were used by Chileans and Singaporeans during the first year of the two FTAs in fiscal 2004.The remaining more than 6,700 unused H-1B slots were returned to the total pool of 65,000.
The introduction of the "E-3" visa in the US-Australia FTA in May 2005, which is essentially an H-1B visa only for 10,500 Australians a year, is another novelty that invariably will make the annual congressional H-1B cap less reliable as a measure of foreign high-skilled labor inflows into the United States.
1 The E-3 further indicates that at least for "allied developed countries," high-skilled visas are increasingly becoming a bargaining chip in FTA negotiations. This does not, however, so far seem to be the case in US FTA negotiations with developing countries.
10 aggregate H-1B categories and saw by far the biggest numerical decline following the end of the long US economic boom in 2001.
In contrast, the number of H-1B petitions for initial employment approved for aliens who were inside the United States at the time of the petition (row 5) has been relatively stable since 2000, at approximately 65,000 a year, albeit rising slightly to 85,000 in 2001. Recalling that most in this group were on academic F-1 visas, the relative stability over the entire period further indicates that any fallout from reduced applications to US universities has yet to reflect in the number of foreign graduates entering the US labor market. As such, while US companies have reduced their import of foreign high-skilled workers, they have continued to hire approximately the same number of foreign graduates from US universities as they did in 2000. 23 Here it should be emphasized that the regulations concerning H-1B (as well as L-1) visas, unlike those for other US temporary visas, allow a visaholder "dual intent." This means that aliens may temporarily enter the United States for work purposes and simultaneously lawfully pursue permanent residency (for both themselves and their immediate family) while in the United States without affecting their H-1B visa status. The lack of a requirement for foreign residence while applying for a "green card," as well as the opportunity to travel in and out of the United States during such an application process, make the H-1B visa a desirable way to obtain US permanent residency.
The stability in the number of foreign students hired indicates that the utilization of this channel by this group has not been affected by either the recent tighter US labor market or the post-9/11 security fallout. Hence, in the last couple of years, the H-1B program has continued to be a part of the path of "first a US degree, then a US job, then US permanent residency" for many high-skilled immigrants to the United States. (However, this path has ever more obstacles; see box 2.) Digging deeper into the data on country of origin (rows 6 to 8 in panel A), one sees that Indian citizens account for by far the largest share of H-1B petitions, about half of all petitions granted in 1999-2001, followed at a distance by China, Canada, and Britain. The data in rows 9 to 11, which show that "computer-related occupations" are by far the biggest occupational category for successful H-1B petitions, and in rows 12 and 13, which show that in 2001 about half of all recipients of successful H-1B petitions were employed in the US IT services and hardware industry indicate that in these particular sectors, the use of imported high-skilled Indian labor was widespread during the boom years. 24 23 The 2004 H-1B Visa Reform Act, which adds an additional 20,000 H-1B visas exclusively for foreign nationals who have obtained a master's degree or higher from a US institution of higher education, is a direct attempt at facilitating the continued employment inside the United States of foreign graduates of US educational institutions. However, the fact that only 9,358 (of the 20,000) have been applied for (as of July 28, two months before the end of fiscal 2005) indicates a possible slowdown in the employment by US businesses of foreign high-skilled graduates from US universities. See USCIS public notice, May 24, 2005, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/tempbenefits/cap.htm. 24 The rapid rise in employment of "imported high-skilled IT workers" by US-located firms during the 1990s is further illustrated by the fact that in 1992, only about 6,000 H-1B visas (out of an approximately 50,000 granted that year) were issued to IT-related occupations. Fiscal 1992 was the first year when the H-1B visa "Dual intent" provisions, which allow both L-1 and H-1B visaholders to apply for permanent US residence (a green card) while working in the United States, directly link the entry regulation of temporary high-skilled workers and permanent additions to the US workforce through immigration. However, a number of particular rules concerning the granting of "green cards" make pursuing "dual intent" far more difficult for some nationals-particularly Indians-than others.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, section 201) 1 stipulates that an annual maximum of 366,000 immigrants may be granted permanent residence in the United States under family and employment-based preferences, the latter of which is of relevance to L-1 and H-1B workers. The INA (section 202) further prescribes that the per-country limit for such preference immigrants is 7 percent of the total (i.e., 25,620 of the current 366,000 maximum).
Three types of employment preferences are relevant here: 1) priority workers-multinational company managers, executives, persons with extraordinary ability, outstanding researchers, and academics; 2) holders of advanced degrees (PhDs) and/or possessing exceptional abilities; and 3) skilled workers, professionals, and other workers (the majority of H-1B/L-1 visaholders fall in this category).
All applications for employment-based preferences are processed chronologically from the date of application. This, combined with the 7 percent per-country limit for green card applications and the lop-sided national distribution of dual-intent H-1B and L-1 visas, with Indian nationals making up by far the largest share of visa recipients, has created severe delays for some nationals in acquiring a green card. The Department of State therefore has created "cut-off dates," which essentially is the earliest date by which those from "oversubscribed nationalities" must apply for permanent residence in order for their applications to realistically be processed in a given fiscal year.
The October 2005 Department of State Visa Bulletin (at http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin _2631.html#) indicates that in fiscal 2005, nationals from China (mainland-born), India, Mexico, and the Philippines are expected to face numerical restrictions and delays. As such, under the third preference (skilled worker, professionals and other workers), only those Indians who filed for permanent residence in January 1, 1998, can expect to have their applications processed in 2005-in other words, most Indian H-1B and L-1 visaholders face a more than seven-year delay in acquiring an employment preference-based permanent US residence. The similar cut-off date for Chinese nationals is May 2000, indicating an approximately five-year delay.
As the maximum duration for H-1B visas is six years, these delays will frequently force Chinese or Indian H-1B (or L-1) visaholders to leave the United States before they will be eligible for permanent residency. Obviously, this in effect undermines the "dual-intent" provision for such H-1B (and L-1) visaholders of Chinese and Indian nationalities.
The very long delays facing Indian nationals therefore make it highly unlikely that many-if not most-of the H-1B/L-1 visa recipients from India, who arrived in the United States during and immediately after the information technology boom, will be able to acquire permanent US residency without first having to leave the United States for a prolonged period.
While the likely inability of many recently imported Indian IT specialists to acquire permanent US residence will be applauded by some, its longer-term effects are difficult to immediately gauge. It could be viewed as an expedient way to rid the US labor force of some workers who may no longer be needed as much as they were in 1999-2000, thus plausibly providing better employment opportunities to American workers. However, such a viewpoint is mitigated by the adverse impact of reverse brain drain. These are highly skilled people, whose skills the US economy would benefit from in general. Furthermore, such workers might take up employment and utilize the skills acquired while in the United States in foreign-located direct competitors of US-located companies, which may prove a longer-term competitive threat to these US-located companies.
services and hardware sectors. 25 Because individual petitions cannot be "cross-tabbed," it cannot be discerned with absolute certainty whether the same petitions account for the similar level of decline in all three categories. Nevertheless, it strongly indicates that the number of H-1B visas granted for initial employment to Indians in computer-related occupations, employed in the US IT services and If instead one wishes to gauge the impact of H-1B recipients on the hiring of US workers at a point in time, it would be more appropriate to use data for H-1B petitions approved for initial employment, as only these aliens will be competing with out-of-job Americans for new jobs. H-1B recipients with successful H-1B petitions for continued employment-i.e., aliens already in employment in the United States-do not directly compete in the "new hiring" market. This is particularly so as the opportunities for "job switching" by employed H-1B recipients are limited (see below). As such, the relevant numbers of successful H-1B petitions for initial employment are found in row 3 of panel A in table 3. It should be emphasized that these are the maximum possible numbers of relevant H-1B petitions.
Further, the data in table 3 are all gross numbers-i.e., they indicate only those aliens with successful H-1B petitions. As such, each alien with a successful petition may be viewed as one "filling a vacancy inside the United States." These numbers, however, do not include any information about H-1B visaholders who lose their jobs and then leave the United States. Therefore, these data are not "net H-1B employment data." This is an extremely important distinction to make when considering what to compare table 3 data with.
Most dynamic US labor-market analysis is carried out using changes in net employment as measured in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics (CES) and Current
Population Survey (CPS) programs. 29 However, comparing changes in "net employment" with the 28 More sophisticated estimates can be made, adjusting these population numbers for deaths, emigration from the United States, and transfers to permanent US residence, among others. See, for instance, Lowell (2000) . However, introducing such additional assumptions in the estimations is both beyond the scope of this working paper and unlikely to materially alter the results. 29 See www.bls.gov/ces/home.htm and www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm for more information on these programs. gross number for successful H-1B petitions for initial employment (i.e., a proxy for vacancies filled by foreigners) is erroneous. 30 Instead, the number of successful H-1B petitions for initial employment ought to be compared with the gross job gains (i.e., total vacancies filled) in the relevant period and category.
Such comparisons, however, face terminal data problems, as data on US gross job gains are extremely limited. The BLS Business Employment Dynamics program 31 currently collects data on gross job gains and losses on a quarterly basis for the entire US private nonfarm economy and a limited number of large economic sectors. 32 BLS staff Pinkston and Spletzer (2004) have made limited calculations of the number of annual gross job gains and losses. 33 But to make valid "apples-to-apples" comparisons between data on successful H-1B petitions and gross job gains, detailed gross job gain data for only high-skilled jobs are required, as H-1B visas by definition are given only to applicants with a bachelor's or higher degree. 34 For instance, if one were to take the ratio of the number of all successful H-1B petitions for initial employment and the total number of gross job gains in the US economy, the result would be vastly understated and invariably show a very limited share of new jobs snapped up by H-1B recipients. This would be because the very large number of gross new low-skilled jobs created in the US economy would very substantially "inflate the ratio denominator"-i.e., the total number of gross job openings.
Currently, data on gross job gains for only high-skilled jobs (or high-skilled by occupation) do not exist in the United States. Therefore, such attempts to accurately gauge the direct impact of H-1B recipients on hiring of US workers are not possible.
In the presence of such severe data limitations, it is nonetheless pertinent to point to the best approximation of the number of "imported high-skilled foreigners" in the US labor market. This number is found in panel A, row 4 of table 3, which shows the number of successful H-1B visa petitions approved to foreigners for initial employment who were outside the United States at the 30 See, for instance, Department of Commerce, Digital Economy (2000), p. 51, for such an incorrect comparison of gross data with net changes in employment. Comparing the number of approved H-1B visa petitions in IT occupations in 1999 with the change in net high-skilled employment yields the grossly inflated result that H-1B recipients took up 28 percent of all new IT occupation jobs. The fact that this comparison is based on all H-1B petitions, rather than just the petitions approved for initial employment, further inflates this result. 31 See www.bls.gov/bdm/home.htm for additional information. 32 These sectors are "Total Private Sector," "Goods Producing," "Natural Resource and Mining," "Construction," "Manufacturing," "Service Providing," "Whole Sale Trade," "Retail Trade," "Transportation and Warehousing," "Utilities," "Information," "Financial Activities," "Professional and Business Services," "Education and Health Services," "Leisure and Hospitality Services," and "Other Services." 33 It is important to realize that, unlike with net employment growth data, one cannot simply annualize quarterly gross flow data to get annual data by summation. Gross annual data look at the gross number of jobs gained over the year, while quarterly data examine gross jobs gained during the year. See Pinkston and Spletzer (2004) . 34 Long work experience may also qualify applicants without a bachelor's degree or higher. As such, in 2003, 1.6 percent of all approved petitions were from applicants with less than a bachelor's degree (USCIS 2004, table 7) . time of the petition. These data intuitively correspond to the concept of "imported skills" as "the bringing into the United States of an alien to fill a new position." 35 It is clear that the extent of such importing of skills during the boom years from 1999 to 2001 was not negligible. During the last three years of the economic boom, US-located companies brought in about 270,000 highly skilled workers from abroad to fill newly created US jobs. However, as the job prospects in the US labor market deteriorated dramatically after 2001, the number of imported aliens declined considerably, reflecting the cyclicality described above.
The fact that 25,637 and 28,879 H-1B petitions were granted for initial employment in computer-related occupations in 2002 and 2003, respectively, nonetheless indicates that there continues to be a large demand from US-located IT services corporations for high-skilled foreign workers, even under adverse IT sector labor-market conditions and at average wages close to the US average in these occupations ($50,500 in 2003 for new H-1B visaholders in computer-related occupations and $63,000 for H-1B recipients continuing employment-i.e., with a minimum of three years' work experience). 36 A negative impact on IT workers' wage levels from this continued foreign labor supply therefore is possible. Some researchers argue that the matter is not one of IT occupational labor shortages but rather one of US IT companies aggressively pursuing through the H-1B program the cheapest legally available labor. 37 It must be kept in mind, however, that the fact that more H-1B petition recipients in computer occupations entered the US job market, while net employment in computer occupations declined, does not in itself mean that "foreigners replaced Americans in the computer sector." This is because even as net employment declines, gross job creation in the US economy remains high.
Consider that during the 2001 recession, when net US private nonfarm employment declined with more than 2 million jobs from the peak in March 2001 to the recession trough in November 2001, the average quarterly gross job gain (Q2, Q3, and Q4) was 8 million. 38 While no data exist for gross high-skilled jobs gains, it seems very unlikely that total gross high-skilled job gains should have declined as much as the (gross) number of successful H-1B petitions for initial employment, namely 35 Note, however, that such a number is not available on an occupational basis, only in the aggregate. All the occupational data thus consist of petitions granted to aliens both inside and outside the United States at the time of the petition. 36 In May 2004, the average annual wage for all US computer and mathematical occupations-irrespective of experience-was $65,510. As the classifications, tenure, and experience levels of the two groups are dissimilar, the exact numerical difference in wage levels cannot be directly compared. 37 It is disputed whether an actual labor shortage existed among IT occupations (Veneri 1999 , NRC 2001 or whether it was a shortage of cheap labor (Matloff 2003) . See also Wasserman (2001) for research suggesting that increased demand for skilled workers worldwide caused by technological change makes separating out the impact of high-skilled immigration on wages difficult. 38 Data from the BLS Current Employment Statistics and Business Employment Dynamics Programs.
All told, the visa data clearly indicate that "skills import" by US-located IT services and hardware companies of foreign-largely Indian-computer-related H-1B visaholders was substantial in the years of rapid economic growth in the sector and hence underpinned sectoral nonwage inflationary growth. The data show a very large decline after 2001 in the number of new visa petitions approved (and visas issued) for aliens seeking initial employment, particularly from India, in the IT services sector. As such, the data point toward a much diminished aggregate impact on the US labor market of H-1B visas after 2001. This strongly cyclical nature of import of IT workers to the United States is also found in other developed economies, such as Canada and France, where data are available. 39
III. WHO HIRES H-1B VISAHOLDERS AND AT WHAT WAGES?
It is obvious that due to the vast differences in the average wage levels between the United States and countries such as India, many highly skilled Indian IT workers would be willing to work in the United States at wages less than the prevailing US wage, as even a fraction of the prevailing US wage would allow them to well support a family in India. It is equally obvious that IT companies located in the United States would have a direct interest in hiring such highly skilled workers at such lower wages.
In order to avoid such downward wage pressure from H-1B visaholders, US law contains a number of specific rules about what H-1B visaholders must be paid: H-1B recipients must be paid either 1) the actual wage-i.e., the wage rate paid by the employer to all other individuals with similar experience, qualifications, education, job responsibilities and function, specialized knowledge, and other legitimate business factors for the specific employment in question, or 2) in the absence of similar US workers at the workplace of the H-1B recipient, the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the area of intended employment. 40 Several sources may be consulted to find the correct prevailing wage for a given H-1B visa petition. A request for a prevailing wage determination may be filed with the local State Employment The employer is responsible for the truthfulness of the information provided in the H-1B petition. That the employer has several sources to choose the prevailing wage from raises the issue of whether employers choose the one that provides the lowest estimate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Department of Labor to determine whether a given source is acceptable and to deny the foreign labor certification if the provided prevailing wage information is deemed nonauthoritative.
Third parties may launch a complaint with the Department of Labor alleging inaccuracy of the provided prevailing wage information in individual petitions.
A SESA prevailing wage determination cannot be challenged, nor does it seem probable that a prevailing wage that is in accordance with wage sources provided by the Department of Labor itself can be so successfully challenged. The majority of H-1B petitions use official prevailing wage data from these sources (figures 2 to 21), so it seems unlikely that employers are systematically depressing wages by providing inaccurate data on prevailing wages.
On the other hand, federal law CFR 665.731 (d) (4) 46 explicitly states that "[N]o prevailing wage violation will be found if the employer paid a wage that is equal to, or more than 95 percent of, the prevailing wage…." Therefore, it is essentially legal for US employers to pay H-1B recipients 5 percent less than the prevailing wage, which, not surprisingly, is the lower range for wages offered to H-1B recipients. If US employers are found by the Department of Labor to pay their H-1B workforce less than 95 percent of the prevailing wage, they will be required to pay them the full 100 percent. In other words, companies face no real financial penalty for paying their foreign high-skilled workers up to 5 percent less than the prevailing wage.
Furthermore, it is the employer that applies for the H-1B on behalf of a foreign worker. Therefore, the opportunities for "job-hopping" in search of better wages elsewhere in the United States are limited for the alien, as he or she has to find another employer to file the H-1B petition. 47 This might give employers some scope for further downward wage pressure, despite what their LCA filing may state. The fact that an H-1B petition costs an employer a minimum of $1,435 likely adds to the sway that employers have over H-1B recipients. 48 Therefore, the official filing data from the FLC database should not be viewed as definitive data, rather as the best aggregate data available. 49 An interesting question is, who are the US companies that hire aliens on H-1B visas? Two detailed data sources reveal the US-located companies that apply for permits to employ H-1B However, it is crucial to realize that an LCA filing by an employer does not mean that an H-1B petition will automatically be approved by the USCIS. The FLC department explicitly states that a one-to-one relationship does not exist between the number of approved LCA filings and the number of H-1B petitions ultimately approved. The number of LCAs the Department of Labor typically certifies is more than three times the number of H-1B visa petitions the USCIS approves. 51 Because of such large discrepancies at the aggregate level, one cannot relate the number of certified LCAs a company has (from the FLC database) with the number of H-1B visaholders it actually employs. Table 4 52 The fact that no data are available for most of the companies in table 4 does in no way mean that the average for those companies for which data are available is the average for all companies. The companies for which data are available generally provide these data in the SEC filings, as part of their general description of their business model and risks associated with it. This probably means that companies provide information about the number of H-1B/L-1 visaholders in their US workforce only if the number is so big that it is important to their business model. In other words, the fact that no data are available for most companies-for instance, #1 ranked Motorola-likely means that for these companies, the share of H-1B/L-1 visaholders is very low. This, however, does not apply to those Indian companies for which no data are available. In their case, the lack of data is because they are privately held companies that do not submit filings to the SEC or similar entities. As these companies directly compete with public Indian companies, the average number of H-1B/L-1 visaholders in these companies is likely to be similar to that in Indian companies for which data are available.
19 US immigration legislation regulating the H-1B visa program has already attempted to address the issue of using an "exclusively H-1B visa recipient workforce." Legislation covering H-1B visas (CFR 655.736) defines "H-1B-dependent employers" and "willful violators." 53 An "H-1B-dependent employer" is defined as one that either 1. had fewer than 25 full-time equivalent employees 54 employed in the United States and employed more than seven H-1B nonimmigrants;
2. had at least 26, but not more than 50, full-time equivalent employees in the United States and employed more than 12 H-1B nonimmigrants; or 3. had at least 51 full-time equivalent employees employed in the United States and employed H-1B nonimmigrants in a number that was equal to at least 15 percent of the number of such full-time equivalent employees.
A "willful violator" is defined as an employer that either 1. violated Department of Labor proceedings under section 212(n)(2) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(n)(2)(C) or Department of Justice proceedings under section 212(n)(5) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(n) (5) or 2. committed either a willful failure or a misrepresentation of a material fact during the fiveyear period preceding the LCA and this has been made public on or after October 21, 1998. US-located employers that are "H-1B-dependent employers" or "willful violators" are subject to two additional attestation obligations that other US employers seeking to employ H-1B visa recipients are not. First, they are prohibited from hiring any H-1B recipients (see below for description of an exempt group) if it leads to the displacement 55 of any US worker(s), either directly (i.e., in its own workforce) or indirectly (at a worksite of a second employer). 56 Second, such employers are required to take good faith steps to recruit US workers in the United States for the US jobs for which H-1B visas are being sought. Such measures must entail procedures that meet 53 Available at www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/ETA/Title_20/Part_655/20CFR655.736.htm 54 Excluding bona fide consultants or independent contractors but including all persons who are consistently treated as "employees" by the employer for all purposes including FICA, FLSA, etc. 55 Displacement has two components: One, it entails a US worker being "laid off," i.e., a US worker loses his or her job for reasons other than discharge due to inadequate performance, violation of workforce rules, or other causes related to the worker's performance or behavior at the job. Two, it entails that the H-1B worker takes over an "essentially equivalent job" previously held by a US worker, as determined by job responsibilities, qualifications, and experience of the workers and area of employment. 56 See CFR 655.738 at www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/ETA/Title_20/Part_655/20CFR655.738.htm for further details.
industrywide standards and offer the prevailing compensation-at least as much as the compensation to be paid to the H-1B recipient. 57 In other words, the several Indian (and similar US) companies that, according to their SEC filings, employed a large number of H-1B recipients, thus yielding workplace ratios far in excess of the thresholds listed above (15 percent of the total workforce, given the size of the operations of these Indian and US companies), will qualify as "H-1B dependent employers" and subsequently be unable to hire H-1B recipients who directly replace US workers.
On the face of it, therefore, the frequently mentioned stories of US workers in IT companies being "forced to train their replacements (frequently Indian) and thereafter fired" 58 would be against US legislation, and such companies could be pursued legally. Therefore, prevention of such "instances of abuse" is entirely a matter of enforcing existing US legislation, rather than a broader issue for the H-1B visa program.
However, certain H-1B visa recipients are exempt from these regulations, and their hiring even by "H-1B dependent employers" and "willful violators" does not require that these US-located companies adhere to the additional attestation obligations laid out above. This group of H-1B recipients consists of those who either; 59
1. are receiving a wage at an annual rate of $60,000, including cash bonuses and similar compensation but excluding benefits such as health insurance, life insurance, and pension plans 60 or 2. have attained a master's degree or higher (or its equivalent) in a specialty related to the intended employment. 61 This means that it is indeed possible to start a business in the United States and staff it entirely with H-1B visa recipients or replace entirely an existing company's US workforce with H-1B visa recipients, provided that these workers are paid more than $60,000 per annum or all have relevant master's or higher degrees. As such, the only particular constraints facing such a business model, 57 See CFR 655.739 at www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/ETA/Title_20/Part_655/20CFR655.739.htm for further details. 58 One of the best places to find such press anecdotes is the news section of the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech) at www.washtech.org/news/. 59 See CFR 665.737 at www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/ETA/Title_20/Part_655/20CFR655.737.htm for further details. 60 The H-1B recipient is required to receive at least $60,000 per annum, and the required salary cannot be decreased or prorated if the H-1B recipient has a part-time schedule. 61 The master's or higher degree must be from an institution that is accredited or recognized under the law of the country where the degree was obtained and equivalent to a master's or higher degree issued by a US academic institution. An academic degree cannot be substituted with experience or demonstration of expertise in the academic specialty (i.e., no "time equivalency" or "performance equivalency" will be recognized as substituting for a degree issued by an academic institution). Relevant US authorities-the USCIS and the Department of Labor-are solely responsible for consulting appropriate sources of expertise in determining the equivalency between a foreign and a US academic degree. which seems to be present in the US IT services sector (table 4), in terms of acquiring H-1B visas are the salary floor of $60,000 per annum, where none exist for other employers of H-1B visa recipients, and the requirement for a master's degree or higher, where a bachelor's degree will suffice for all other H-1B visa recipients. 62 With many prospective employees offered wages below $60,000 a year, it can be concluded that in order to legally be in the United States, all workers in this group must possess a master's degree or higher in a specialty related to the occupation in question. In other words, this is genuinely a group of companies that seeks to hire very highly skilled foreign workers to work in the United States. It cannot be discerned with certainty whether these H-1B recipients are inside or outside the United States when the company applies for the H1-B visa, but it seems likely that the vast majority of these workers are hired directly in India-i.e., "imported to work in the companies' US operations." Second, many of these H-1B visa recipients are paid very close to 95 percent of the prevailing wage. While in full accordance with US labor-market regulation, these wages strictly speaking, undercut those of similar US workers by the legal 5 percent. Hence, it seems readily justified when this group of companies is accused of suppressing the wages of US high-skilled IT workers, in addition to the downward pressure on wages applied by the additional relevant labor supply. But since this group of Indian companies (and their direct US competitors-see, for instance, Cognizant Technology Solutions in figure 20) are operating in accordance with all US labor-market laws, it is not justified to accuse them of systematic "abuse" of the H-1B program. Third, it should be noted that many of the H-1B visa recipients hired by this group are indeed offered wages significantly above relevant US prevailing wages, indicating that these workers possess additional relevant skills that companies must (and are willing to) compensate them for.
A similar temporary visa program in Germany, where up to 20,000 "IT green cards" were available to IT specialists from August 2000 to , was a failure, as it could not attract 20,000 applicants. 63 This indicates the strong cyclical downturn in the German economy but also that the US labor market continues to be a huge draw, relative to other developed economies, for highskilled IT labor.
It is clear from figures 8 to 14, which show LCA filings for the leading US IT companies, that the practice of offering many H-1B visa recipients only 95 percent of the US prevailing wage in fiscal 2004 is not just among Indian (or similar US) IT services companies but also among such US IT industry household names as IBM, HP, Intel, Motorola, Microsoft, Dell, and Cisco. That such legal wage-cost cutting is also occurring among US IT industry leaders should probably not be surprising, given the intense competitive pressures in this industry. However, it is also clear that relative to the Indian IT services companies, many more H-1B recipients to be possibly employed at major US IT companies are offered wages significantly above the US prevailing wage. This is likely an indication both of the more diverse operations of the bigger US companies and of the H-1B system continuing to be an oft-used way for these companies to access highly skilled and experienced alien workers more broadly.
Assuming that what was found above-i.e., that a very large group of these workers are indeed of Indian origin and brought to the US from here and hence, at the US prevailing wage, can be expected to earn significantly above what would be possible in India-concerns the entire cohort, several issues must be addressed.
Considering that it is illegal for H-1B visa recipients to obtain employment at any other US employer other than the sponsoring one, the fact that so many of them are offered wages significantly above the legal minimum of 95 percent of the prevailing wage, indicates that for this group of US and Indian IT services companies, "worker turnover" may nonetheless be an important issue. Why else would wages significantly above the legally mandated 95 percent of the US prevailing wages be offered to people who cannot look for work elsewhere in the United States? 63 Only 17,177 "IT green cards" were issued by the German authorities during the four-year period, and of these, only 12,406 had very long-term work and residency permits of three months or more. About a quarter of the visa recipients were Indian, with between 500 to 900 each from Romania, Russia, Poland, and China. See "Information Und Kommunikation In Aktuellen Zahlen," Statistische Bundesamt, October 5, at www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm2004/p4220024.htm (accessed May 16, 2005) .
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The answer probably has two aspects: First, it is possible that competing US IT services companies can poach individual H-1B visa recipients from one another, only that each time they have to go through the rather cumbersome and costly H-1B application process. 64 Hence, in a competitive industry, the very best H-1B visa recipients possessing the most genuinely sought after skills can negotiate a wage premium by requiring different US IT services firms to "outbid" each other. Second, with employment opportunities in countries like India expanding, the very best Indian IT workers will demand substantially above US prevailing wages to be lured to work in the United States, even though US prevailing wages in IT are substantially more than wages at home. Hence, this wage premium offered to many H-1B visa recipients in the IT services sector might be an early indication that a truly global market for the very best IT talent has already emerged.
Figures 15 to 21 underline the broader importance of the H-1B visa program. They show how some of the leading US financial and industrial companies (GE and Goldman Sachs), universities (Harvard, MIT, and Los Alamos National Laboratory), and healthcare providers (Kaiser Foundation Hospitals) are also frequent users. In these non-IT industries, the wage offered to H-1B recipients generally is likely to be far more in excess of the US prevailing wage than seems prevalent in the IT industry. This, in extension of the paragraph above, indicates that many H-1B visa recipients hired by these organizations possess valuable skills in excess of those required to be eligible for an H-1B visa. As such, it seems that these organizations are already engaged in the broader global hunt for the very best employees, which is also evident in the IT services industry.
Finally, as the vast majority of the LCA filings by the companies/institutions in figures 2 to 21 provide prevailing wages from official US sources, there does not seem to be any problem with US employers speculating in using the "lowest prevailing wage source."
In summary, it is clear that in the IT sector Indian and similar US "outsourcing-type IT services providers" are utilizing US labor-market legislation to the limit to push for competitive labor cost advantages, frequently resulting in a 5 percent legal undercutting of US prevailing wages by H-1B visa recipients. Thus, there seems to be reason to believe that limited downward wage pressure exists from the H-1B program in particular IT services, in addition to the wage-moderating effects of the additional foreign supply of such high-skilled workers. On the other hand, many H-1B recipients, employed both in the IT services sector and other economic sectors, receive wages substantially above the prevailing US wage. This premium indicates that this group is indeed bringing highly sought after skills and experience into the US labor market, well above what is required for visa eligibility.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This working paper presents as detailed a picture as possible of the extent of imports of high-skilled foreign labor on H-1B and L-1 visas to the United States. The number of such foreign workers in both categories substantially increased until 2001 but declined sharply in subsequent years. The two visa programs have been found to be very responsive to cyclical developments in the US economy, particularly with respect to new visa petitions for initial employment in computer-related occupations and for Indian nationals, where large declines have occurred.
Due to scarce data, one can estimate only a wide range for the total H-1B populationroughly between 400,000 and 750,000 in 2002 and 2003. Due to the gross, not net, nature of data on H-1B petitions and visas, and the dearth of similar aggregate gross job gains data for high-skilled workers, currently available data do not allow for systematic investigation of the impact of foreign workers on the hiring prospects of US workers. However, it is possible that the substantial H-1B population in the United States may adversely affect US wages in some, particularly computerrelated, occupations.
H-1B visaholders are a very important source of labor for several Indian and US IT services companies. No evidence of systematic abuse of the H-1B visa programs by these companies exists in the official data examined, although such "offshoring/outsourcing type IT services providers" aggressively pursue all legally available paths to cut labor costs, including paying foreign workers only the legally mandated 95 percent of the prevailing wage.
Large US IT, financial, and manufacturing-sector companies, as well as leading educational institutions, continuously demand H-1B visaholders. These institutions frequently offer their foreign H-1B recipients wages substantially above the prevailing US wage, indicating that such workers continue to bring to the US economy highly sought-after skills that command a substantial wage premium in the labor market.
The highly cyclical character of both the H-1B and L-1 visa programs, which led to significant imports of foreign high-skilled labor during the economic boom but much less subsequently, combined with continued heavy use of the programs by leading companies in the United States, leads to the aggregate conclusion that the programs do exactly what they were meant to do in the 1998 American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act, namely improve the US workforce and US competitiveness. Reductions in the programs could therefore lead to an unnecessary decline in the competitiveness of US companies and the US economy as a whole.
If global US companies face more legislative obstacles to employing highly skilled and competitively priced taxpaying people in the United States at US wage levels, they will continue to get better opportunities to send the work overseas, thanks to declining trade barriers, technology, and improving skill levels across the world. Therefore, instead of attempting to "close the US borders" to foreign high-skilled workers, policymakers should focus on domestic initiatives to improve education and skills of adversely affected US workers and on enforcement of existing labor regulations. 
